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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND REBUTTAL
Opening Note: Briefs by Appellees misrepresent the evidence in the record
and rely on evidence not relied upon by the juvenile court in terminating Mr.
H's parental rights.
The Appellees—the State and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL)—misrepresent
the evidence as found in the record. While most likely unintentional, such a
practice is extremely prejudicial to the appellate process and destroys the integrity
of appellate review.
The Appellees misstate and mischaracterize critical evidence in this case as
well as the findings of fact of the trial court. Furthermore, the Appellees rely upon
evidence that, while in the record, goes beyond the findings of fact of the trial
court. These are no trivial points because the evidence is the heart of this appeal—
whether it was sufficient to terminate Mr. H's parental rights and whether Mr. H
had notice to satisfy statutory requirements and constitutional due process. Mr. H
objects to the Appellees' material misrepresentations of the record and argues that
the misrepresentations prejudice this appeal and his attendant grounds for relief.
While the purpose of the reply brief is not to engage in a lengthy exposition of
these misrepresentations, the following are five important examples:
1. The State claims that Mr. H visited his children "only once in person, and
only once by phone in the course of almost two years."1
This statement is clearly erroneous when referenced to the "source"
of the facts. The State took these facts from the trial court's findings of
1

Appellee State's brief at 14.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fact—attached as an addendum to its brief. While the findings of fact say
that indeed Mr. H had visited his children during Easter 2001 and had
talked to them by telephone on October 31, 2003, there is absolutely no
statement in the court's findings that conclude that these were the only or
exclusive contacts Mr. H had with the children during the period in
question. Indeed, the record is replete with other substantial, undisputed
contacts Mr. H had with his children, namely frequent and regular
telephone contact.3
2. The State claims that "the Division did take actions which assured that
Appellant had actual knowledge of the proceedings [involving his
children]."4
This statement is wholly unsupported by the facts of the record and the
trial court's findings of fact. First, no where in the record was testimony
even introduced claiming that the State had personally informed Mr. H of
the proceedings. Second, while testimony was introduced at trial claiming
that DCFS made some undocumented telephone calls to a phone number
and some messages were left with a third person5, no evidence was ever
introduced that Mr. H had knowledge of these proceedings through the

2

R. 430-31.
1 Tr. 114-116
4
Appellee State's brief at 15.
5
1 Tr. 25, 59-62
3
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third person. That link in the chain of notice is wholly lacking, although
even if it did exist, it would be insufficeint.
Furthermore, the testimony of A.C. at trial, who testified that she spoke
to Mr. H and informed him of a court proceeding some five months after
the children were removed from the custody of their mother, did so at her
own volition and not at the request of the State.6
Thus, the State did nothing that provided any actual or legal notice of
the hearings to Mr. H, and the State's assertion here is false.
3. The GAL claims that "[i]n April 2001, the case worker left messages telling
the Father the Children were in state's custody. She continued to call him
and leave messages during the next two months, yet [Mr. H] did nothing to
help them or involve himself in the process. 1 Tr. 28. R 431."
The GAL misrepresents the facts here in at least two ways.
First, the cited reference to the transcript clearly shows that the
caseworker openly admitted that she did not begin attempting to contact
Mr. H about the children's removal until May or June 2001, in violation of
statutory notice requirements.7 This is significant because it illustrates the
lackadaisical attitude that DCFS and the Attorney General's office have had
about Mr. H and notifying him of the State's action regarding the children.
Even if the caseworker had been able to contact him in May or June 2001—

6
7

l T r . 84-85.
1 Tr. 29-30, U.C.A. §§ 62A-4a-202.2 - 202.3; 78-3a-306 - 307, 309
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1

at least one full month after the shelter hearing—it would have been too
late to intervene and assert custody at the shelter hearing or even appeal the
order from that shelter hearing.
Second, the caseworker explicitly said that she never left messages
o

when she called the telephone number she had for Mr. H.
4. The GAL similarly claims that "the case worker made numerous telephone
calls to the Father, leaving messages to the effect that the Children had been
removed. R.431 She kept up the telephone calls for the next two
months."9
Again, the GAL misrepresents the record here on two accounts.
First, the record is crystal clear that the caseworker never left any
messages with a third party that the children were removed. The
caseworker's own testimony was that four or five times in October 2001
she called a telephone number given to her by the children's mother and left
a message with a female person who answered.10 The substance of the
message was that she was the caseworker for the children and asked that
Mr. H call her back. Contrary to the misrepresentation of the Guardian ad
Litem, the message the caseworker left did not tell Mr. H that the children
had been removed from the care of their mother.11 This is an important

8

lTr.25-26.
Appellee Guardian ad Litem at 4.
10
lTr. 59-60.
11
lTr. 59-60.

9
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distinction because a central issue to this appeal is how much Mr. H knew
about the proceedings involving his children. Even if he had received the
messages—which was never shown at trial, Mr. H would have never
known from this message that the children had been removed by the State
from their mother's custody. The caseworker never said that the children
had been removed; only that she was the caseworker for the children.
Second, the GAL misrepresents the truth about the frequency of the
calls and messages. The initial caseworker testified that she received a
telephone number from the children's mother that was reportedly for the
residence of Mr. H and made "at least five" phone calls to the telephone
number over two months (May - June 2001).13 This caseworker never left
a message and never spoke to anybody.14 The second caseworker made a
four or five telephone calls purportedly to the residence of Mr. H in
October 2001 and left the messages as described above. Those phone calls
were all made within a week's time.
Therefore, there was no caseworker that left a series of messages
over several months saying that the children had been removed. That is a
fiction.

1 Tr. 59-60.
1 Tr. 25
1 Tr. 25.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

5.
was hiding from the Division because he, [Mr. H] didn't want to be
responsible for the children."15
Again, this is a fiction, unsupported by the record. Reviewing the
GAL's citation for this "fact," it is entirely unclear about who told her that
Mr. H did not want to be responsible for his children's welfare—it could
have been DCFS gossip for all we know.
The record reads: "I visit the home. I asked the family contact. What
I was told was that they hadn't heard from him, he hadn't been paying child
support, he was hiding from them because he didn't want to be responsible
for the children."16 But the caseworker could not have meant that she had
talked to Mr. H's family because a few seconds later, the caseworker
admitted that she had never visited Mr. H's home or reached Mr. H's
family by telephone.
Therefore, again, the assertion that Mr. H's family had told the
caseworker that Mr. H was trying to evade responsibility for his children is
unfounded and unsupported by fact.

15

Appellee GAL's brief at 4.
1 Tr. 37.
17
1 Tr. 25-26, 37.
16
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There are numerous other facts that the Appellees misrepresent, such as
whether Mr. H paid money toward the care of his children , whether Mr. H ever
had contact information for his children's caseworkers when the caseworkers
either never left messages or it was never proven that he did receive any alleged
messages, whether Mr. H inquired about the children, sent them letters, cards, gifts
or money,19 whether Mr. H was notified about the visit with the children that the
mother had allegedly arranged with DCFS , and that the main sources of
information about Mr. H were the mother and the maternal grandmother of the
children—who were clearly adverse parties—and intentionally deceived Mr. H
about the whereabouts and welfare of the children.21
All of these misrepresentations—and there are more—are prejudicial to Mr.
H's claims and arguments in this appeal. The misrepresentations, moreover, are
not trivial, but go to the heart of Mr. H's case and thus create confusion over facts
that are not reasonably in dispute. On these "facts" that Appellees have
misrepresented, reasonable minds are not likely to differ as to their interpretation
because their meanings are clear when viewed in their context and chronology.
Such material misrepresentations cannot be glossed over and calls into question
the reliability and accuracy of Appellees' entire briefs. Thus, Appellees' factual
analysis and arguments are fundamentally tainted and flawed.

18

1 Tr. 27.
2Tr.43.
20
lTr. 62-64.
21
lTr. 112-116.
I9
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Furthermore, in its brief, the State uses and relies upon evidence not relied

i

upon in the juvenile court's findings. The State does this to bolster its claim that
the facts are sufficient to support the termination order in question.
i

The State dredges up facts that far predate the removal of the children in
April of 2001.

The facts the State raises deal with Mr. H's knowledge of the

mother's alleged drug use, etc. before the children were removed by the State.
While these facts may be part of the record—they were introduced at trial by
witness' testimony, the juvenile court overtly disregarded these "facts" as a basis
for terminating Mr. H's parental rights. A question before this Court is whether
the evidence before the juvenile court and its factual findings were sufficient to
justify terminating Mr. H's parental rights. The juvenile court's findings of fact,
then, are at issue here. Those findings make no references to any alleged facts that
predate the April 2001 removal of the children from their mother's custody. The
State's inquiry into these alleged facts go beyond the questions before this Court
and only serve to prejudice Mr. H's position.
On these two grounds—that the GAL and the State misrepresent the facts
contained in the record and rely upon allegations not relied upon or supported by
the juvenile court's findings of fact—Mr. H objects to the misrepresentations of
Appellees. Accordingly, Mr. H requests that this Court appropriately filter the

22

Appellee State's brief at 2, 3, and 8.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellees' Material "Facts" and factual analyses in their argument because the
Appellees' factual misrepresentations render these sections inherently tainted and
flawed. Mr. H also requests that this Court take whatever further action it feels
necessary to remedy this unfortunate situation.
I.

The trial court's findings of fact are inconsistent and insufficeint as a
matter of law to conclude abandonment, thus warranting vacation of
the order.
Neither the State nor the GAL even addresses Mr. H's arguments that the

findings of fact

are internally inconsistent and that they contradicted the

conclusion of abandonment. Therefore, on these arguments, the State and GAL
must be "satisfied with the statement provided by the appellant."24
The briefs of Appellees focus on the sufficiency of the evidence to
conclude abandonment. As already shown, the State and the GAL misrepresent
the facts or rely upon facts not relied upon or found by the trial court in their
analysis of this issue. This practice goes beyond, and does not even answer, the
question before this Court. The issue is whether the trial court's findings were
insufficient as a matter of law to conclude abandonment. Therefore, the scope of
the issue is limited to those facts as found by the trial court and extraneous facts
should not be considered.
Because the State's and GAL's arguments on this issue rely upon
extraneous alleged facts and misrepresentations of the facts, and thus do not even
23

Findings of fact are required under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
be made with specificity.
24
Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540 ^[22 (Utah 2000)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may Q
contain errors.

i

answer the question before this Court, this issue of sufficiency of the evidence
should be held in favor of the Appellant, Mr. H.
II.

The State's egregious violations of Mr. H's absolute rights to
immediate notice of the removal of his children and subsequent
hearings, along with the violations of Mr. H's Due Process rights, are
inextricably related to the termination proceeding, and the appropriate
remedy is vacating the termination order.
While the GAL agrees with Mr. H that the due process and notice

violations were egregious, the State argues that it used reasonable efforts and
made a good faith attempt to contact and locate Mr. H.
Moreover, the State argues that the proceedings immediately after removal
of Mr. H's children—to which he received no notice for nearly a year—"in no
way compromised his parental rights."25
Finally, both the GAL and the State dispute that vacating the termination
order is the appropriate remedy, even if the State violated statutory notice laws and
Mr. H's right to due process.
a. The State did not make reasonable efforts to personally contact Mr.
H as required by law and thus precluded him from asserting his
interests in custodv and his right to appeal earlier orders.
In its brief, the State alleges that it made reasonable efforts and a good faith
attempt to contact and locate Mr. H. The State cites two "facts" in support of this
claim. First, two caseworkers had made phone calls to a telephone number
reported to be that of Mr. H. Second, the mother of the children and a foster
mother had confirmed to DCFS that Mr. H knew what was going on with the
25

Brief of Appellee State at 16.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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children. While there is significant factual dispute as to these facts—which were
not found by the trial court—even if true, either or both of these bases are legally
insufficient to satisfy the State's burden of making reasonable efforts and a good
faith attempt to locate Mr. H. Moreover, telephone calls are woefully inadequate
and are facially insufficient in terms of providing legal notice; thus, it is fallacy to
focus on the telephone calls that the State or a third-party allegedly made in this
case. Notice by telephone—even if it was made in this case-is insufficient as a
matter of law to satisfy statutory requirements, the rules of procedure, and Due
Process.
The purpose of notice is to give the opposing party a meaningful
opportunity to address the claims made against him and to be meaningfully
heard.26 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that proper notice
requires "apprais[al] of interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.... But when notice is a person's
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process."27 Thus, "a State may not
deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the
State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real
opportunity to protect it. [Citations omitted]" 28

zo

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-6 (1950), see
also Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville City, 2000 UT 81, If 49, 13 P.3d 581.
27
Id. See also Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797-8 (1996):
28
Richards, 517 U.S. at 804:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, the Rules of Civil Procedure require a search of reasonable diligence
in good faith.29
In a case that came before the Supreme Court of Utah, the Court held that a
reasonable search in this context requires a search reasonably calculated to
actually find the parents.30 In that case, In re Pitts, the State had gained custody of
children by alleged abandonment. The State attempted to locate the parents by
checking with the post office, utility company, and the telephone book.31 Not
being able to locate the parents through these means, the State published notice in
a newspaper.

When the parents appeared some six months after the alleged

abandonment and the children were already placed for adoption, an appeal ensued
on the order of termination of their parental rights.33 The Court found that
checking with a hotel and the utility company, and consulting of a phone book was
"not 'diligent inquiry' but the lack of'diligent inquiry.'"34 The Court particularly
faulted the State with failing to check with relatives that would know the
whereabouts of the parents.35 Because of the lack of a diligent search for the
parents, the Court set aside the order terminating the parental rights.36

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976):
In re Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975).
31
Id at 1245-46.
32
Id at 1246.
33
Id
34
Id at 1246, F2
35
Id at 1246.
36
Id. at 1249.
30
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In view of this similar case, it is clear that in ten or so undocumented
telephone calls, the State did not relieve itself of its burden of a reasonable search
in good faith.

The DCFS caseworker admitted at trial that she failed to consult a

phone book38—although she knew the approximate whereabouts of Mr. H.39 The
caseworker also admitted that she did not follow DCFS's own policies and
procedures in an attempt to locate Mr. H.40 Furthermore, the caseworkers relied
on a telephone number they received from adverse parties—the mother and
maternal grandmother.41 The State made absolutely no efforts to locate or contact
Mr. H besides these undocumented telephone calls. If the State was found not to
have made a reasonable search in the Pitts case, where the State did more in an
effort to locate the parents than in the case at bar, certainly the State did not make
a reasonable search for Mr. H.
Furthermore, five critical facts speak to the State's lackadaisical attitude in
contacting and locating Mr. H, illustrating that the State was not sincerely
interested in locating and notifying Mr. H. First, the DCFS caseworker—in
knowing violation of the notice laws42—did not attempt to contact Mr. H until a
full month or more after the children's shelter hearing.43 Second, the caseworker

37

See also an opinion (not yet published) from California, InreN.S., 2002 WL
31270246 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.)
38
1 Tr. 35-41.
39
R. 11, lTr. 37-38.
40
1 Tr. 35-41.
41
1 Tr. 25, 59
42
1 Tr. 31.
43
1 Tr. 25.
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testified that she did not feel it was important to contact Mr. H, even though he
had a right to notice.44 Third, the caseworker suggested that it would have been a
lot of work for her to place the children out of state with the father.45 Fourth, a
DCFS caseworker, Ms. Covert, testified at trial that she had made a telephone call
to a number she believed to be that of Mr. H and a woman answered the phone and
allegedly confirmed Mr. H lived at the residence, but the caseworker never asked
for the address of the residence in order to serve Mr. H or mail notice to him.46
And fifth—and perhaps most damning—the State never attempted to file a Motion
or Affidavit for Alternative Service, although required by law and the rules of
procedure, after a reasonable search had been made.47
The State cannot be willfully ignorant of the whereabouts of a known
parent of children in the State's custody. The State did nothing to notify Mr. H but
rely on information from adverse parties who testified they deceived Mr. H about
the situation of the children.

The position of the State is tantamount to equating

a reasonable search with a caseworker glancing at her desk now and then to see if
the parent's contact information has arrived on a silver platter.
In summary, the extent of the State's search to notify and locate Mr. H was
about ten phone calls to a number the State received from an adverse party. That

1 Tr. 30.
1 Tr. 50.
lTr. 71.
U. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d), U.C.A. §78-2a-31 l(3)(b).
1 Tr. 112-115.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is all. Clearly, this does not satisfy the notice requirements of the Utah Code and
the Rules of Civil and Juvenile Procedure.49
Furthermore, the State alleges that Mr. H was not victim of any Due
Process violation. The State makes the novel and inconsistent argument that the
State need not initially attempt to search for a parent, just send notice of a
termination proceeding to the parent and hold a hearing.50 The fallacies here are
obvious. First, the State is clearly under a duty, as already established, to make a
reasonable, diligent search for the parents immediately after the State takes any
action in juvenile court as to children. Second, the State is under the absolute duty
to make some kind of service of a petition for termination—personally, or, if
unable—after a reasonably diligent search—by publication.
However, setting aside the clear notice violations and lack of a diligent
search for Mr. H in good faith, the State clearly violated Mr. H's constitutional
rights to Due Process51 under the same facts.
"Due Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."52 The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the
deprivation of parental rights is a drastic action which must be handled through in
49

Including, but not limited to U. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d), 5(a); U. R. Juv. Pro. 13(b),
18(b)(5); U.C.A. §§62-4a-202.2-3, 78-3a-306-307, 309, 311, 314, 407, and 408.
50
Appellee State's brief at 18, allegedly quoting State ex rel. J.R.T. v. Timperly,
750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1988).
51
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1: No state shall. .. deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
52
Smith v. Org, of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,848-9
(1977). (as quoted in In re S.A., 37 P. 3d 1166, par 11 (Utah 2001))
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persounum procedures. Children are not realty, and rights pertaining to them must
be handled with care and proper procedure."53 The Court has suggested that a
"high standard of care and diligence [is] necessary in seeking out parents."54
In this case, there can be no doubt that Mr. H's right to Due Process was
violated by the State's refusal to make a search for him, serve him pleadings and
notices, and afford him an opportunity to be heard early in the proceedings. The
State and the GAL are correct in stating that time is of paramount importance in
this kind of a case. Thus it is just as important for the parents to receive timely
notice of proceedings and be appraised of the nature of those proceedings by the
opposing party—not through a third party, even though the State wants to shift the
burden in this case on the mother, foster parent, etc., to have given notice to Mr.
H.
Due Process, the Rules of Procedure, and the Utah Code squarely burden
the State and DCFS to notify parents of proceedings involving their children.
Parents have an absolute right to such notice. Mr. H is not arguing that "the State
has some sort of absolute responsibility to track him down and drag him into
court."55 Mr. H merely argues that the State must employ reasonable efforts to
locate him and strictly follow the notification requirements as established by law.
Arguably, had the State complied with the law, observed the notice
requirements and their own procedures for locating a parent whose whereabouts
53

In re Pitts at 1248.
Id
55
Appellee State's brief at 15.
54
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are unknown, and made a reasonably diligent search for Mr. H, this case would
have turned out differently. Mr. H could have asserted his interests in custody to
the children, appeared in court early on, complied with reunification services if
necessary, and appealed any adverse orders. But because of the State's complete
failure to notify and respect Mr. H's Due Process rights, Mr. H has been
absolutely precluded from asserting these rights except to attack a termination
proceeding based upon abandonment and the subsequent termination order. Mr. H
argues that the basis for abandonment—if it even existed, which he disputes—was
direct result of the State's failure to comply with notice and service of process
requirements.
This is the heart of this case. The State violated the notification and Due
Process rights of an absent party.
b. The proceedings to which Mr. H never received notice directly
compromised Mr. H's parental rights.
The State further argues that the Petition to Terminate Mr. H's parental
rights was properly served, so earlier violations of notice requirements and due
process are not equitable grounds to attack the order terminating his parental
rights. In support of this position, the State points out that the termination
proceeding is separate and distinct from the other proceedings (shelter,
permanency, adjudication, etc.).
First, by definition and their very nature, the previous juvenile court
proceedings dealt with custody of Mr. H's children, child support, visitation, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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other issues that directly compromised Mr. H's parental rights. Thus it is
completely disingenuous and inaccurate to assert that the prior proceedings "in no
way" compromised Mr. H's parental rights.
Second, while termination of parental rights is a separate proceeding in
juvenile court, it is virtually married to the other dependency proceedings. If there
is no evidence of abandonment prior to removal of the children by the State, as
was found by the trial court in this case, a parent's lack of involvement or
participation in those proceedings, at the very least, sets the groundwork for a
finding of abandonment by that same court—it sets the wheel in motion.
Therefore, in the context of termination on the grounds of abandonment, the Utah
Supreme Court has referred to a termination proceeding as the "default" judgment
in child dependency matters.56 In other words, the failure of the parents to come
forward and be involved in the court's proceedings, (or if there is sufficient
evidence of abandonment prior to the proceedings), may cause the State will
petition for termination of the parent's rights on the basis of abandonment.
Thus the analogy becomes clear. Proper service of a notice of a default
judgment would certainly not cure an initial failure of a plaintiff to serve the
summons and complaint upon the opposing party. Similarly, the proper service of
a petition to terminate parental rights cannot cure the petitioner's complete failure
to make a reasonable search for the parent and properly serve the parent with
notice and documents of previous proceedings.
56
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c. Vacating the order terminating Mr. H's parental rights is the
appropriate remedy.
The State and the GAL argue at length that vacating the order terminating
Mr. H's parental rights is not the appropriate remedy in this case. On the contrary,
vacating the order is indeed the only remedy for egregious violations of statutory
notice requirements and due process rights.
In In re Pitts, the Utah Supreme Court set aside the order terminating
parental rights when the State had failed to make a reasonable initial search for the
parents.
Indeed because the juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
necessarily confined by the express limited authority granted by the legislature, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "if the Juvenile Court does not comply
specifically with the provisions of [applicable statutes] in a termination
proceeding, any decree entered is in excess of its jurisdiction, is void, and subject
to direct attack in a proceeding to vacate."57 Because the juvenile court did not
comply, or order compliance, with due process and notice requirements designed
to protect the interests of absent parties, the order terminating Mr. H's parental
rights is beyond the court's jurisdiction and therefore void.
Recognizing that juvenile proceedings are set in a civil context, the remedy
is even clearer. A plaintiffs failure to serve process initially, or at any significant
time during the proceedings, is nearly per se grounds to have a subsequent default

In re Baby Girl Marie, 561 P.2d 1046, 1047 (Utah 1977).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

judgment set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. An
entire litany of cases supports this view.58
The GAL argues that Mr. H "slumbered" and "sat on" his rights by not
getting involved in the court proceedings when he allegedly knew that there were
proceedings involving his children.59 However this conclusion lies on a critical
assumption that makes the conclusion a fallacy. The unspoken assumption is that
Mr. H knew that his rights were at issue. As a matter of law, his supposed
knowledge is irrelevant until Mr. H is properly served. Any alleged "notice" that
Mr. H had received through the grapevine was little more than gossip—and a
complete red herring. Mr. H did not receive legal notice via actual service or
alternative service if so ordered.
But what is clear is this—that if the State had duly and appropriately
complied with its duty to notify and serve Mr. H, he would have known that his
parental rights were at issue from the beginning. This underscores the reasons and
policy for personal notice—to apprise the opposing party of not only proceedings,
but also the nature, substance, and issues involved in the proceedings. While at
best Mr. H might have known that there were proceedings in Utah involving his
children, there is absolutely no evidence showing that Mr. H knew that the
58

For example, see Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct.App. 1987);
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah
1975); Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961); Utah
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Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, 22 P.3d 1249; Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d
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proceedings involved his parental rights. Proper notice from the beginning would
have cured this problem. Mr. H had an absolute right to such notice, but never
received it.
III.

The policy and effects of the State's position with regards to notice is
intolerable and severely dilutes Due Process rights.
It may go without saying, but it is critical to recognize the effects of the

State's position in this matter. The State's position is that a few phone calls to a
telephone number received from an adverse party are a sufficient basis to satisfy
due process and reasonable search requirements.
This is a devastating policy that would almost completely absolve the State
from any duty to attempt to locate out-of-state, non-custodial parents in a timely
and proper manner.
In this context, notice and Due Process requirements are substantively
meant to protect the rights of absent, non-custodial parents and their children.
Adopting the State's position in this case takes away any real teeth in enforcing
notice requirements—effectively allowing the plaintiff to serve the notice of a
hearing on default before the defendant is ever properly served the summons and
complaint.
CONCLUSION

Because of Appellees' misrepresentations to this Court as to the facts of
this case and failure to respond, The Appellees State and GAL failed to
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substantively attack Mr. H's arguments that trial court's findings of fact were
insufficeint as a matter of law.
The State did not make reasonable efforts in good faith to search out,
locate, and contact Mr. H. A few phone calls does not a reasonable search make.
The State violated numerous statutory notice laws and Mr. H's right to Due
Process. The proceedings prior to termination, to which Mr. H never received
proper notice or service, and the termination proceeding itself are inherently
related, much like a hearing on default is with a civil complaint. The utter failure
of the State to serve him properly for eleven months created the circumstances of a
fictitious "default" because Mr. H did not involve himself in proceedings to which
he was never properly invited.
Vacating the order terminating Mr. H's parental rights is the only proper
remedy in this case because the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and therefore void. Furthermore, vacating the termination order is
customary in a substantiated attack on the sufficiency of initial service, including
proceedings in the juvenile court.
Finally, this Court should reject the State's position that notice and due
process requirements were complied with in this case. Such a position effectively
dilutes those rights into oblivion and absolves the State of any duty to locate
absent, non-custodial parties in juvenile proceedings.
A decision of this Court in favor of Mr. H would only affect juvenile cases
in a very narrow set of circumstances—when termination of parental rights is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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based upon alleged abandonment that occurred (1) after the State removed the
children and (2) before proper and legal service to the parent. Under these narrow
circumstances, the order of termination ought to be void and vacated as a matter of
law.
For these reasons, Appellant Mr. H requests that this Court vacate the lower
court's order terminating his parental rights.
DATED and EXECUTED this 30th day of October, 2003.

JJ. Danielson
Attorney for Mr. H

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3 Is day of October, 2003,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of the Appellant to be sent, via U.S.
Postal Service, postage prepaid, or hand-delivered, to the following:
Martha Pierce
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
450 South State St., W-22
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0403
Carol L. C. Verdoia
John M. Peterson
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140833
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0833
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230

iw^

V

TtfUrt**^^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

A

535 P.2d 1244.
(Cite as: 535 P.2d 1244)

c
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, In the Interest of PITTS, Erika R.
and Pitts, Vallarey L.,
persons under 18 years of age, Gloria Gandy,
Appellant.
No. 13882.
May 14, 1975.

The Juvenile Court District No. 2, Salt Lake County,
Judith F. Whitmer, J., entered order permanently
depriving parents of custody and terminating all
parental relationship of and to their two minor infant
girls and placed girls with agency for adoption, and
the mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod,
C.J., held that a child should not be taken from its
parents save by clear and convincing evidence of
intention to give up parental rights, something almost
akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
there was want of diligent inquiry in attempt to locate
parents where, among other things, no attempt was
made to contact the maternal grandmother, the State
did not inquire of paternal grandmother as to the
father's whereabouts and notice of publication of
petition for termination was made only in a weekly
newspaper having comparatively small circulation in
the county.
Order set aside.
Crockett, J., concurred separately and filed opinion.
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any effort to locate father except for alleged
telephone check with post office, power company
and a hotel, there was no inquiry of any persons or
relatives or anything else with respect to the father,
publication of notice of deprivation of parental rights
was made in small weekly newspaper having
circulation of about one percent of that of the largest
metropolitan daily paper and no effort was made to
contact the children's maternal grandmother.
*1245 Gordon F. Esplin, of Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Service, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank V. Nelson,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for the State.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:
Appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a
juvenile court order permanently depriving the
parents of custody and terminating all parental
relationship of and to their two minor infant girl
children, and placing them with an agency for
adoption. It is adjudged that said order (July 16,
1974) be vacated as prayed.
This case is here solely on the record before us
having to do only with the motion to vacate, the
evidence adduced at the hearing thereon, the order
denying it, October 17, 1974, and the order of
permanent deprivation, July 16, 1974. The two
orders above followed the delivery of the children by
the paternal grandmother, Hattie Pitts, to a Welfare
Department 'shelter' on or about November 9, 1973,
(because, as the record reflects, she was financially
incapable of supporting them).

West Headnotes
i l l Infants ^ ^ 1 7 8
211kl78 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 21 Ik 16.8)
A child should not be taken from its parents save by
clear and convincing evidence of intention to give up
parental rights, something almost akin to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
J21 Infants €^=>198
21 Ik 198 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 21 lkl 6.7)
There was no diligent inquiry to locate the parents
prior to permanently terminating parental rights
where, among other things, there was no evidence of

One Carlson, an employee of the State Division of
Family Services, testified that he filed a petition on
November 30, 1973 (which is not in the record before
us), which contained allegations that the children had
been left with an acquaintance at a Baywood Hotel,
where some days later the room caught fire, and the
children thereupon were delivered to Hattie;JTNJJ
that the whereabouts of the parents were unknown,
and that the parents had failed to provide adequate
support and supervision for the children. This
petition was heard on January 8, 1974. Prior thereto,
said Carlson, he had 1) 'checked with the post-office
to see if the father or mother were listed as receiving
mail in the Salt Lake Valley,' receiving a 'No' answer.
He then checked the Baywood Hotel (after the fire
that apparently caused a transfer of the children to
Hattie), to see if the parents were getting mail there,
then checked with the local power company to see if
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they were customers, being told they were not, after
which he filed in the clerk's office, the petition with
an affidavit for publication *1246 of notice thereof,—
and that's all he did.

FN1. Who, as stated above, delivered them
to the shelter.

One Meyers, who is completely unidentified in the
record, said he did two things after Carlson had made
inquiries, which were done in January or February, so
that they were done long after the petition was filed
on November 30, 1974, and hence of no probative
value whatever in connection with 'due diligence' in
locating the parents.ITN21

FN2.
We list his efforts here, for
informational purposes only and to show not
'diligent inquiry' but the lack of 'diligent
inquiry,' and to show that even though he
may have made the effort before the petition
was filed, in no way would it have been the
kind of diligence required to strip away from
a mother and father all parental rights. He
went to Hattie's home, and was told that she
did not know where Gloria, the mother of
the children, was, but there is no evidence
whatever, to indicate that be bothered to ask
where Hattie's own son, the father of the
children, was. Then he looked in the phone
book to see if he could locate Clara Gandy,
the maternal grandmother. He said 'I found
four Gandys listed, none of which were Mrs.
Gandy.' There is nothing in the record to
indicate he called any of those listed, but it
is highly significant that he said one was a
wrecking company.
Two of the three
numbers of persons listed represented the
same phone, and the same address, and
referred to a husband and wife. A bit of
'diligent inquiry' would have shown this fact,
had he looked in Polks 1974 Salt Lake City
Suburban Directory on page 312. Such bit
of'diligent inquiry' would have revealed in
the same directory on the same page, the
listing of a Mrs. Clara Gandy,--the name of
the very person he was seeking.

A Mrs. Lu Jean Smith, D.F.S. worker, testified that
she knew Hattie when the latter brought the children
to the shelter and said she didn't know where the
parents were. She checked with the baby sitter who
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had been at the Baywood Hotel, who didn't know
where they were either.
Betty Mattson, another D.F.S. employee, knew the
children's mother. This employee said she filed a
Petition for Permanent Deprivation of the parental
rights on May 9, 1974, since 'the parents had not
made contact' with the children 'since November 9,
1973 . . . a period of more than six months' FFN3] and
'it appeared to me that neither parent was going to
return at that point.' She also said she signed an
Affidavit for Publication of Notice. Finally, after the
July 16, 1974, hearing and order of Permanent
Deprivation, Miss Mattson had contact with the
mother between August 5 and 10, 1974, when the
latter, after returning to Salt Lake, had called upon
the former inquiring as to the whereabouts of her
children,--when Mattson told the mother in no
uncertain terms that 'she had been permanently
deprived' of the children and that 'the children were
being placed for adoption, and that she could not see
them,'-nor would Mattson 'tell her the foster home at
which they were placed' and that she (the mother)
seemed upset.

FN3. It was six months to the day, which
suggests an unwarranted and premature
effort to place these children out for
adoption before the parents' return (which
the petition she filed called for), and the
resulting default judgment of July 16, 1974,
ordered placement of the children with
D.F.S. 'for placement in a suitable adoptive
home.'

Based on the evidence as recited above, the juvenile
court made a finding of fact that The efforts of the . .
. Division of Family Services to locate an address for
the parents were diligent pursuant to Section 5 5 - 1 0 88, Utah Code Annotated 1953.'
[11f2] It is suggested that the evidence recited above
clearly indicates that there was no 'diligent inquiry'
made and that this matter is dispositive in favor of the
mother and father of these children, if, for no other
reason than that there is no evidence whatsoever, of
any effort to locate the father except for an alleged
telephone check with the postoffice, power company,
and a hotel where there is no evidence that either
parent resided, and a doubtful Publication of Notice,
so far as this record is concerned, there having been
no inquiry of any persons or relatives or anything else
with respect to the children's father. In *1247
addition to and a further weakening of such weakness
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of inquiry, the following uncontradicted facts are
reflected in the record to enhance the ridiculosity of
permanently stripping parents of their parental
rights,-which means forever, gentle reader:
Gloria Gandy, is the mother of the children,
Lawrence Pitts is the father, and his mother, Hittie
Pitts, is the paternal grandmother. Clara Gandy is the
maternal grandmother.
In October or November, 1973, Gloria saw Hattie to
see if she would take care of the children for awhile.,
while she (Gloria) was gone. She did not leave therm
at that time with Hattie for some undisclosed reason.,
but left them with Wanda Brown, a friend, who was
happy to have them and wanted to keep them until
she got back. Gloria told her to keep them a few
days, then take them to Hattie. She went to Tampa,
Florida, was there with the children's father until the
following July, during which time she tried to make
contact with the children. She called her mother
several times and wrote to Hattie, with no reply. She
got in touch with her mother, through her sister, who
answered the phone, about April or May, near her
birthday. She gave her sister her address and asked
who the kids were. She kept writing to Hattie, with
no response. When she came back she called on
Hattie but was told the latter had moved. Then she
saw her mother who told her the children were up for
adoption. She called Betty Mattson who told her she
couldn't see the children nor would she be told where
they were. At this juncture she hired a lawyer; she
volunteered that: 'I love my children very much and
really do care for them. . . . I just had to leave town
but was planning to send for them. I didn't think
anything like this would happen. No one contacted
me about the proceedings with the Court.' She talked
to her mother the end of July or in August, 1974. On
cross-examination she said she went to Tampa
because she 'was in trouble with the law.' No reason
therefor was requested and none was volunteered.
She said she didn't expect Hattie to take care of the
children, but knew she would manage, and that she
didn't think she'd be gone away so long. Asked if the
postoffice returned any letters she sent to Hattie, she
said 'no, why should they?'—which makes sense.
Gloria's mother, Clara Gandy, said the Division of
Family Services did not contact her at any time. She
didn't contact Gloria until July or August. She said
Gloria contacted her other daughter by phone, that
she, Clara, tried unsuccessfully to contact Hattie until
August and was told that she took the children to he
Welfare. She said no one contacted her by mail,
phone or personally to ask where Gloria was. There
is no evidence that the other daughter ever was
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contacted. She said her daughter gave her Gloria's
address around March or April, 'after the kids'
birthday.' Counsel for the court, at some length, and
in a somewhat uncavalier manner, elicited an answer
from Hattie to the effect she didn't really know and
was confused. Gloria, on the sideline, volunteered
'Mom, I called you in March. It was right after my
birthday.' Counsel for the court responded by saying,
'Will you shut up and let her answer the question?'
evincing some sort of inverted saintly effort to get at
the truth, it would seem. The judge backed him up
with an admonishment.
The only substantial or effective impeachment as to
the facts were on cross- examination of the grandma,
Clara, who not only confessed her confusion as to
what appeared to be a rather immaterial fact, but who
obviously displayed considerable affection for her
daughter and grandchildren.
The facts abstracted above presented by Gloria are
uncontroverted save as mentioned above. The state
presented only facts relating to time Gloria was
absent, * 1248 and what some aides of the Division of
Family Service did that was claimed to constitute
'diligent inquiry.'
It is significant that the children's grandmother, Clara
Gandy, was a resident, knew Gloria's address, as did
Gloria's sister. More significant is what the State did
not do. It did not do anything showing any diligent
inquiry with respect to the children's father,-and so
far as this record is concerned apparently did not
even inquire of his own mother where he was. It did
not contact Clara, made no phone calls to any of what
amounted to only two Gandys in the phone book, did
not bother to examine the 1974 directory that
presumably had all the names and addresses of all the
residents in the Salt Lake area, and if it did examine
such directory it failed to find the name and address
of Mrs. Clara Gandy plainly printed therein. The
weekly newspaper in which it published notice of
hearing, had a comparatively small circulation in Salt
Lake County, which likely may not have had as wide
a potential for notification and which, in a case like
this, along with other claimed acts of diligence,
would seem not to constitute reasonable diligence in
alerting someone, nor the most 'diligent' means of
notice, since it is fairly common knowledge that its
circulation is about one per cent of that of the largest
metropolitan daily paper published in Utah, where
the chance of reaching the parents here, or interested
relatives who might be alerted, is one hundred to one.
If the people involved in this case had shown as
much compassion for the parent-child relationship,
and less for split-second speed in procedure designed
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to accommodate the baby market that flourishes in
this country, whether black, gray, red or statutory, the
State, with its facilities, certainly could have used
better and faster means for finding the whereabouts
of this mother.
This writer is impressed with a concession made by
counsel for respondent, nonetheless, to the effect that:
Respondent cannot help but agree with appellant's
contention that the deprivation of parental rights is
a drastic action which must be handled through in
persounum procedures. Children are not realty,
and rights pertaining to them must be handled with
care and proper procedure. Appellant, however,
wants this Court to believe that such is an absolute
standard which has very few exceptions, if at all.
We believe such language comes close to our
thinking to the effect that a child should not be taken
from its parents save by clear and convincing
evidence of intention to give up parental rights,—
something almost akin to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The respondent, having made the quoted
pronouncement must have difficulty,—particularly
with that part about realty,-when it cites Redwood v.
Kimball,[FN4] to support the chopping off of parents'
rights, since that was a suit to quiet title to realty.
This provokes some interesting language of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Walker v. Hutchinson City:{FN5J

FN4. 20 Utah 2d 113, 433 P.2d 1010
(1967).

FN5. 352 U.S. 112, at 116-17. 77 S.Ct.
200. at 202-203, 1 L.Ed.2d 178.
'It is common knowledge that mere newspaper
publication rarely informs the landowner of
proceedings against the property,' and 'In too many
instances notice by publication is no notice at all.'
Certainly this language is quite apt in this case where
a paper's circulation is so small as to be about one per
cent of that which would be provided in a paper
whose circulation is a hundred times as great in
circulation,-all for a very few dollars more.
Respondent's citing of Lloyd v. Third District
Court,[FN6] also has its differences between the
instant case, since it is a divorce action with socalled marital res extant in this state. It is quite
understandable *1249 that married people who have
no other kinship, and who are adults, should be
amenable to service by publication,-a lot more and
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perhaps with a little less 'diligent inquiry' than where
a blood relationship is involved,- not the case two
adults, a man and wife,-but between and adult and a
minor. Some social service workers in their zeal, may
be naturally the victims of some sort of biological
myopia, or are unenlightened or calloused as to the
depth of motherly affection, sometimes forgetting
that blood is thicker than printer's ink, that absence
makes the heart grow fonder, and that instinct itself
waters down the oft-repeated, but as often trited
aphorism that the welfare of the child is the only
concern of the judiciary. They sometimes forget that
even though a mother disciplines her child by
administering a spanking, the one spanked almost
always seeks asylum and confort in the very arms
that administered the discipline.

FN6. 27 Utah 2d 322. 495 P.2d 1262
£1972}.

We believe that the evidence in this case is almost a
complete stranger to and hardly equates with that
high standard of care and diligence necessary in
seeking out parents when troubled human waters
brew. Any fracture of such relationship should be
condoned only by clear evidence of the highest
quality.
We are of the opinion and hold that the proof here
does violence to the far reaching order of permanent
deprivation of parental rights,-amounting to forever,
which is a long, long time.

ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

CROCKETT, Justice (concurring separately).
In view of the fact that that majority of the court are
of the opinion that the order should be set aside, I
voice no objection thereto. This, because I assume
that opens the way for proceedings on the merits as to
what should be done about these children. I realize
that the requirement of diligent search for a parent in
such situations is not without difficulties.
Nevertheless there are circumstances where the duly
authorized publication 'in a newspaper having general
circulation in the county in which the action is
pending' serves a necessary and useful purpose. It is
authorized by our Rule 4(0(1), U.R.C.P.. and had
since time immemorial been recognized as valid by
our statutory, (see former Section 104-5-12,
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U.C.A.1943), had by our decisional law, see Ricks v.
Wade. 97 Utah 402, 93 P.2d 479: and 126 A.L.R.
664.
It is worthy of comment here that Rule 4(f)(l\ just
referred to, was amended on June 26, 1972, to
provide that if'. . . the court determines that service
by mail is just as likely to give actual notice as
service by publication, the court may order that
service ...' may be made by mail.
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published,
except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered
published for purposes of rule 977.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.
In re N.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v.
BRENT S., Defendant and Appellant.
No. F039957.
(Super.Ct.No. 96902-2).
Oct. 10,2002.

County department of children and family services
sought termination of father's parental rights. The
Superior Court, Fresno County, No. 96902-2, Martin
C. Suits, J., terminated parental rights. Father
appealed. The Court of Appeal held that: (1) father
was a presumed father, not an alleged father, and was
entitled to reunification services; (2) department
failed to exercise due diligence to locate him; and (3)
termination of his parental rights prejudiced him and
violated due process.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes

County department of children and family services
failed to exercise due diligence to locate presumed
father, and, thus, termination of his parental rights
prejudiced him and violated due process; nothing
indicated department's inquiries of mother about the
father and his relatives, mother knew how to reach
father's grandmother, department never followed up
on indications that father was in Washington state,
and the district attorney located the father. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
JH Infants € ^ > 1 5 5
21 Ik 155 Most Cited Cases
121 Infants € = ^ 1 7 2
21 lk!72 Most Cited Cases
Putative father was a "presumed father," not an
"alleged father," in dependency case and was entitled
to reunification services, even though he did not
formally initiate a parentage proceeding to establish
paternity by blood test or sign a voluntary declaration
of paternity, took child into his home for only three
months, and allowed the mother to take child despite
his prior concerns about drug abuse and lack of
adequate care; the father openly held out the child as
his natural child, never disputed the mother's decision
to name him on the birth certificate, belatedly
participated in the proceedings, and volunteered for
blood test. West's Ann.Cal.Fam. Code § 7611, subd.
(d); Welf. & Inst. Code § 316.2.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Fresno County. Martin C. Suits, Judge.
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Phillip S. Cronin, County Counsel, and Nannette J.
Stomberg, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

OPINION
THE COURT. [FN*1

111 Constitutional Law €^>274(5)
92k274(5) Most Cited Cases
1X1 Infants € = > 1 9 8
2llk!98 Most Cited Cases

FN* Before Vartabedian,
Cornell, J., and Gomes, J.
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*1 Brent S. appeals from an order terminating his
parental rights (Welf. & Inst.Code. § 366.26) to his
daughter, N.S. [FN1] Appellant first received notice
of the dependency proceedings approximately three
months before the originally scheduled section
366.26 hearing. Further complicating matters, since
the outset of the case, respondent Fresno County
Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) characterized appellant as N.S.'s alleged
father. Despite serious questions of whether
appellant's due process rights had been violated and
whether he was entitled to presumed father status, the
court proceeded with its termination order. Appellant
places the blame alternatively on N.S.'s mother, the
Department, the court, and his trial counsel. On
review, we conclude it was error to proceed with the
termination hearing and will reverse with directions.

FN1. All statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
In July 2000, the Department detained four-year-old
N.S. after her mother was hospitalized on a Penal
Code section 5150 hold. The Department in turn
petitioned the juvenile court to exercise its
dependency jurisdiction (§ 300, subd. (b)) over N.S.
based on the mother's mental health and substance
abuse problems. On the face of its petition, the
Department identified appellant as N.S.'s father,
checked a box for address "unknown" and placed a
question mark in a box marked "alleged."
Neither at the initial detention hearing nor at any
subsequent hearing did the trial court make any
inquiry of the mother as to the identity and address of
all alleged and presumed fathers as required under
section 316.2, subdivision (a). [FN2] There is also
nothing in the record to indicate what inquiry the
Department made of the mother with regard to
appellant.

FN2. Section 316.2, subdivision (a)
provides:
"(a) At the detention hearing, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the court shall

inquire of the mother and any other
appropriate person as to the identity and
address of all presumed or alleged fathers.
The presence at the hearing of a man
claiming to be the father shall not relieve the
court of its duty of inquiry. The inquiry shall
include at least all of the following, as the
court deems appropriate:
"(1) Whether a judgment of paternity
already exists.
"(2) Whether the mother was married or
believed she was married at the time of
conception of the child or at any time
thereafter.
"(3) Whether the mother was cohabiting
with a man at the time of conception or birth
of the child.
"(4) Whether the mother has received
support payments or promises of support
with respect to the child or in connection
with her pregnancy.
"(5) Whether any man has formally or
informally acknowledged or declared his
possible paternity of the child, including by
signing a voluntary declaration of paternity.
"(6) Whether paternity tests have been
administered and the results, if any.
"(7) Whether any man otherwise qualifies as
a presumed father pursuant to Section 7611,
or any other provision, of the Family Code

What the record does reveal, however, is that the
Department initiated a search for appellant on July
20, 2000. According to a form declaration of search
dated August 3, 2000, the following records were
searched: "DDS Records, Family Support, Polk
Directory, Sheriff Records, County Jail, Prison
Locator, Fresno telephone books, Adult Probation,
Register of Voters, Personal Property Rolls, SS/SSI
Records, and MEDS." Checkmarks indicating "Yes"
to the word "Located" were typed in the boxes for
Family Support, Sheriff Records and Adult
Probation. There was no indication, however, as to
what information was located. In addition, the
declaration states:
"According to the Family Support Division, a letter
was mailed to [a Vancouver, Washington address].
This address has been bad since March 1, 2000.
Letters have been mailed to varies [sic ] agency
requesting search of records for Mr. [S.] A letter
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has been mailed to the State of Washington
Department of Social Health Services [in
Olympia]. Another letter was mailed to the State of
Washington
Children's
Administration
[in
Olympia]. The last letter was mailed to the State of
Washington Department of Corrections [in
Seattle]. As to [sic ] the writing of this report,
Brent [S.] has not responded to the letter mailed to
him by the Department."
*2 As to this last quoted sentence, there is no
explanation in the record about the contents of the
letter or the address to which the letter was
addressed. Also, the declarant left blank the space
below pre-printed language that stated M[t]he
following attempts were made to locate the party
through relatives, friends or others likely to know the
present whereabouts of the party."
In its social study for the dispositional hearing, the
Department reported the mother was unable to
provide information on how to locate appellant. She
thought he might be living in Washington. The
juvenile court then, in November 2000, adjudged
N.S. a dependent child and removed her from
parental custody. Although it ordered reunification
services for the mother, the court denied appellant
services by virtue of his alleged father status (§
361.5, subd. (a)). The court made no finding at this or
any prior hearing that appellant's whereabouts were
unknown or that the Department made a diligent
search for appellant.
After six months of unsuccessful reunification
services, the mother expressed a willingness to
forego further efforts to reunify with N.S. She also
supported her father's request for N.S.'s placement
with him and his wife in their Wyoming home. The
Department in the meanwhile initiated a request for
an Interstate Compact for Placement of Children
(ICPC) evaluation with the State of Wyoming.
At a six-month review hearing conducted in June
2001, the court terminated reunification services and
set the case for a section 366 .26 hearing. It also
authorized respondent to serve appellant with notice
of the section 366.26 hearing by publication.
Notably, although its social worker claimed that a
"Parent Search" was recently completed and
appellant's whereabouts were unknown, the
Department did not produce a declaration of search in
support of its claim. The social worker also reported
there was no identifying information to locate

appellant.
Then, on July 13, 2001, a Department social worker
received a telephone call from appellant. He reported
he had received a letter about N.S. and child support
and in the process learned for the first time that she
was a juvenile dependent, placed in foster care. The
record does not reveal the identity of the letter's
author or the contents of the letter. County counsel
later argued the family support division apparently of
the Fresno County District Attorney's Office sent the
letter. The letter was mailed to appellant at his
father's house in Washington state.
Appellant acknowledged in the July 13th
conversation that he had not seen N.S. " 'for so long,'
" since she was about two when she lived with him
for approximately three months. According to
appellant, N.S.'s mother, whom he described as "
'really weird' [and] 'pretty crazy,'" had run away. She
would call and tell him he would never see N.S.
again. Claiming that the mother despised him and
should have just called him, appellant said he felt
"bad that I have to fight for my daughter now."
*3 Having only recently been assigned the case, the
social worker promised to call appellant in a week
after she reviewed the case. The social worker did
inform appellant of the scheduled section 366 .26
hearing. However, she gave him the wrong hearing
date. She also advised him to "show up" for the
hearing. Appellant gave her his address and phone
number in Vancouver, Washington.
Approximately a week later, the social worker had
another telephone conversation with appellant. She
informed him of when N.S. was detained and the fact
that the court did not order services for him because
he was an alleged father. Appellant repeatedly stated
he was N.S.'s father. According to appellant, his
name was on her birth certificate and he would do "
'whatever to prove that.' " He wanted N.S., whom he
said he loved, to be placed with him.
The social worker explained to appellant that N.S.'s
case was "in the process of [adoption] assessment."
She added she needed to consult with N.S.'s therapist
about appellant having contact with N.S. since,
according to appellant, he had not had a relationship
with her since she was about two. Appellant
volunteered he " 'should never let her mother get
[N.S.]' " and reiterated he was going to fight for his
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daughter.
Although the social worker promised to get back to
appellant, she did not do so. Instead, in early August
appellant once again called the social worker asking
when he could call his daughter. The social worker
replied she had not heard from the therapist as yet.
Appellant became upset, urging he was N.S.'s father
and asking why did he not have rights. The social
worker reiterated her need to talk to the therapist
because N.S. had been having problems after talking
to her mother.
Appellant questioned why the Department did not
give N.S. to him since he was not "the one that got
[her] into the system." As the social worker tried to
explain the dependency process to appellant, he
became angry "about how we (Dept) didn't look for
him until it was too late for him." By this time in
early August, respondent had formally served
appellant with correct notice of the section 366 .26
hearing. He told the social worker that the mother
knew where he was and did not tell the social worker.
The social worker responded by trying to explain a
parent search to appellant but he again became upset.
Appellant complained he was not given a chance
with N.S. while the mother, who in his estimation
was mentally disturbed, was. He again complained of
how the mother ran away with N.S. and away from
him. He added he and N.S.'s grandparents missed her
and loved her. He apologized to the social worker for
" 'being a jerk' " and thanked her for not hanging up
on him. She told him she would contact him when
she heard from the therapist.
These three conversations were detailed in social
worker narratives and brought to the court's attention
at a hearing in late September 2001. Respondent had
petitioned to terminate visits between N.S. and her
mother. Meanwhile, the court had requested an
update on the ICPC process. During the hearing,
county counsel asked if appellant had been noticed
for the hearing that day. He had not. County counsel
and counsel for the mother agreed appellant had been
requesting services, placement and contact with N.S.
and yet, as county counsel acknowledged:
*4 "we're looking at the child [who] is not a
permanent placement, we're looking at an ICPC to
send the child out of state and we're ignoring this
father[.]"
County counsel also admitted the narratives showed

that appellant only became aware N.S. was:
"in the system in July when he was contacted by
Family Support and that he's been asking for
contact and the social worker apperas [sic ] to have
been putting him off saying that she's going to
check with the therapist. I don't see where she ever
checked with the therapist or ever got back to
him[.]"
Counsel for the mother advised the court that she
did not support the father having contact with N.S.
and urged the court to place her with the grandfather
in Wyoming. The mother did personally admit to the
court that appellant's name was on N.S.'s birth
certificate. Nevertheless, she was apparently opposed
to appellant obtaining presumed father status.
Observing it was not his job to argue whether
appellant was a presumed or alleged father, county
counsel advocated against relying on the mother's
representations and renewed the question of
exploring appellant and his standing. The court
eventually responded by appointing counsel for
appellant, facilitating transportation for him and
continuing the matter to the October date set for the
section 366.26 hearing.
Appellant appeared for the first time in these
proceedings at the October hearing. Because his
attorney had not received discovery and was
unfamiliar with the record, the court continued the
hearing to November 2, 2001. At the continued
hearing, substitute counsel sat in for appellant's
attorney who was absent. Respondent recommended
the court find N.S. adoptable based on the
grandfather's desire to adopt her and terminate
parental rights. When appellant personally objected
claiming "they didn't contact me in time," county
counsel urged that "we need something from the
father indicating what the issues are so we can
respond." County counsel was prepared to proceed
with a termination hearing. After further discussion,
the court continued the matter once again, stating it
would proceed on the continued date with the
termination hearing unless counsel for appellant
filed a motion to set aside based upon inappropriate
notice. In turn, the court ordered a briefing schedule,
a statement of contested issues and discovery on the
issue of notice.
In time for the continued hearing date, respondent
filed a supplemental report regarding, in relevant
part, its efforts to notify appellant of these
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proceedings. It summarized the search it conducted in
July 2000. It also reported the social worker
"submitted a parent search" which was completed
within a matter of days in November 2000 and June
2001. There was no indication in the supplemental
report as to what the words "submitted a parent
search" entailed in each instance. At most, the
Department offered what records are ordinarily
searched. Missing were declarations or other
evidence of what parent searches were in fact
conducted in N.S .'s case. In addition, as had
happened in July 2000, the Department again sent
letters to multiple agencies in Washington state. In
response to the November 2000 letters, the
Washington agencies reported having no record of
appellant's whereabouts. The June letters, on the
other hand, finally led to the Department's acquisition
of appellant's address. Notably, however, the
Department apparently made no effort to serve him
with notice as of the following month when he called
the social worker.
*5 Counsel for appellant, meanwhile, did not file
either a motion to set aside or a petition for
modification under section 388. At the eventual
hearing in December 2001, the court permitted some
testimony by appellant related to notice and N.S.'s
parentage.
On the issue of notice, appellant testified he had
lived all his life in the Camas/Vancouver area of
Washington state. His employment, first as a carnival
worker and for the last two years as a union laborer,
kept him on the road much of the time. Nevertheless,
he considered the Camas/Vancouver area to be his
"home base." For at least the last 12 years, his family,
first his grandparents and later his father, owned the
same residence. He also considered that residence to
be his mailing address. He had taken N.S.'s mother
there for Christmas visits and dinner in years past.
N.S.'s mother maintained telephone contact with
appellant's grandmother between 1996 and 1999.
Even after the grandparents transferred ownership of
the family home to appellant's father and moved
elsewhere, N.S.'s mother still maintained contact with
appellant's grandmother. This was how she reached
appellant in 1999 asking for help with N.S. Appellant
in turn came to pick up N.S. at the bus station in
Fresno and brought her to live with him in his
grandmother's home in the Camas/Vancouver area.
The mother later took N.S. back, by traveling to the

grandparents's home.
On the issue of paternity, appellant testified he and
the mother lived together for the year prior to N.S.'s
birth. Although appellant was not present at the
child's birth, his absence was not of his making.
Rather, the mother ran off the month before N.S.'s
birth and disappeared. Nevertheless, she named
appellant as the child's father on the birth certificate
and, two and a half months later when the mother
needed help, she contacted appellant to care for her
and N.S. He traveled to Imperial, California, near
where N.S. was born, and brought the mother and
N.S. to Fresno where he was then working in a
carnival. Once in Fresno, appellant lived with N.S.
and the mother, worked at the carnival to support
N.S., and thought he and the mother had reconciled.
However, two weeks later, the mother again left
appellant and took N.S. to Imperial. Another time,
when N.S. was approximately 11 months old, the
mother reported to appellant that the person she was
living with beat her and she had nowhere to stay.
Appellant paid for a bus ticket for the mother and
N.S. to travel and stay with the sister of appellant's
current girlfriend. Appellant also paid part of the
mother's and N.S.'s rent. Once again, at some point,
the mother left with N.S. and appellant lost track of
them
Then, in the summer of 1999, a year before the
Department initially detained N.S., the mother
telephoned appellant's grandmother. The mother said
she could not take care of N.S. at that time.
Apparently, part of the mother's problem then related
to drug abuse. When he received word of the
mother's predicament, appellant, who wanted to have
N.S. with him, traveled to Fresno to pick up the child
and bring her to Vancouver. The child then spent two
to three months living with appellant in his
grandmother's house. At some point in the summer of
1999 while N.S. lived with appellant, she became ill.
Appellant sought medical care for her, going so far as
to enroll the child with the State of Washington for
medical benefits. He even considered going to court
in Washington to get a custody order.
*6 However, the mother traveled to Washington to
take back N.S. When the mother arrived in the
Camas/Vancouver area, she appeared to appellant as
though she "wasn't skinny anymore" and "quit doing
the dope." Appellant decided not to pursue custody
proceedings because he thought the mother loved
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N.S. and returning N.S. to the mother's care "would
be the right thing to do." He acknowledged that at the
time he could not take care of N.S. "that well"
although his grandmother offered to help him.
Nevertheless, he "figured [N.S.'s mother] was telling
the truth" apparently about not using drugs. The
mother then returned to Fresno with N.S.
A month or two later, the mother contacted appellant
saying she wanted $10,000 and if he did not give her
money, N.S. was not going to see him. Appellant
refused. Parenthetically, he admitted he never paid
child support for N.S. Appellant heard nothing
further from the mother following that conversation.
He did not know where she was then because the
mother told him different stories about where she was
going or leaving.
He admitted he did not make many efforts to find
N.S. and the mother. At some undisclosed time, he
knew acquaintances of his had seen the mother at the
Fresno Fair. However, he did not go to Fresno then
because he knew he could be arrested. In fact, when
appellant first appeared in October 2001 for these
proceedings, he was arrested for a probation
violation. Apparently, five years earlier, he had
committed what he termed "spousal abuse" involving
N.S.'s mother. At some point, he pled guilty.
In the midst of appellant's cross-examination, county
counsel objected to further testimony. He argued the
issues of notice and parentage were irrelevant
because counsel did not file any pleadings
articulating the disputed issues or citing authority for
her position that appellant was entitled to relief. This
led to considerable argument amongst the parties and
the court. The court, for its part, did not rule on the
relevance objection but did appear to agree with
county counsel. Appellant's trial counsel reminded
the court that she had not been present at the last
hearing and was unaware the court had required her
to file any pleadings. She argued everyone knew
what the issues were: notice and paternity. The notice
issue to her mind was "so obvious." The court
disagreed. The court subsequently admitted the
narratives of the three conversations appellant had
with the social worker in July and August. After
closing arguments, the court found N.S. adoptable
and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I. Introduction

Appellant contends the juvenile court, instead of
terminating his parental rights, should have
granted him presumed father status and reunification
services. Alternatively, he claims that his attorney's
failure to file a motion to set aside the termination
hearing or a modification petition amounted to
ineffective assistance. Fundamental to both of
appellant's arguments is his claim that his due process
right to notice was violated.
*7 Ordinarily at a section 366.26 hearing family
preservation is no longer the goal of California's
juvenile dependency law. Family preservation is of
critical importance from the time the minor is
removed from parental custody (§ 202, subd. (a))
through the reunification period. However, once
reunification efforts cease, the scale tips away from a
parent's interest in maintaining family ties and
towards the child's interest in permanence and
stability. (/// re Marilyn //. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309310, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544. 851 P.2d 826.) At that
point, adoption becomes the preferred permanent
plan. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330,
1344, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562.)
By the same token, the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of
his children is a compelling one, ranked among the
most basic of civil rights. The state, before depriving
a parent of this interest, must afford him adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard. (In re B.C.
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444,
523 P.2d 244.) The means employed to give notice
must be such as one, desirous of actually informing
the absentee, might reasonably adopt to accomplish
it- (/// re Antonio F. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 440, 450,
144 Cal.Rptr. 466.)
II. No Due Diligence
[1] In order for the juvenile court's orders leading up
to the section 366.26 hearing to be accorded finality,
there is a "fundamental requirement of due process,"
that is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. (/// re Emily
R. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1351, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d
285: citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.
(1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.
865.)

Digitized by
the Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben
Clark Govt.
Law School,
BYU.
Orig. U.S.
Works
Copr.
© West
2003 Law
No Library, to
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.2d
Not Officially Published
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 976, 977)

Page 7

(Cite as: 2002 WL 31270246 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.))

Where, as in this case, the Department alleged
appellant's whereabouts to be unknown, the issue
becomes whether due diligence was used to locate
him. (/;/ re Emilv R., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p.
1352, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 285; citing MulJane v. Central
Hanover Tr. Co., supra, 339 U.S. at pp. 317 & 319.)
The term reasonable or due diligence, as used to
justify service by publication, denotes a thorough,
systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in
good faith. [FN3] Where the party conducting the
investigation ignores the most likely means of finding
the defendant, the service is invalid even if the
affidavit of diligence is sufficient. (In re Arlvne A.
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d
109.)

FN3. Here it is undisputed there was no
resort to publication as a means of serving
notice on appellant.

Appellant argues the mother withheld information
while the Department blames appellant because he
was frequently on the road and therefore his address
was not reasonably ascertainable (In re Emilv R.,
supra, 80 Cal.App.4tli at p. 1353, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d
285). On the record before us, we conclude, as
discussed below, the Department failed to show it
used due diligence to locate appellant.
Preliminarily, we observe that never once throughout
these proceedings did the court make any finding that
either appellant's whereabouts were unknown or the
Department made a diligent search for appellant. It
also never conducted its own inquiry into appellant's
identity and location as required by statute (§ 316.2).
In fact, the only times before the fall of 2001 that the
court even mentioned appellant was at the November
2000 dispositional hearing when it denied services to
him based on his alleged father status and in June
2000 when it authorized service by publication even
though the Department never offered a declaration of
due diligence. We point out these omissions because
this is not a case in which prior findings were made
and therefore were presumably correct unless
appellant could show otherwise.
*8 Particularly troubling, in light of appellant's
undisputed testimony, is the lack of evidence
regarding what inquiry the Department made of

N.S.'s mother about appellant. The record is silent on
this point. According to appellant's testimony, the
mother knew his family, that they lived in the
Camas/Vancouver area, and how to reach appellant's
grandmother, if not appellant. The grandmother's
telephone number was listed throughout this period.
However, there is no indication in the record that the
Department ever inquired of N.S.'s mother regarding
appellant's relatives or friends, let alone why she
thought he might be living in Washington.
Identifying family or friends who could assist in
locating a father is an obvious step in showing due
diligence. (See /// re B.C., supra, 11 Cal.3d at 689.
114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244.) Even the
Department's declaration of parent search form is
testiment to this common sense. As mentioned
earlier, the form includes the statement: "[t]he
following attempts were made to locate the party
through relatives, friends or others likely to know the
present whereabouts of the party." That portion of the
form was regrettably left blank when the
Department's social worker executed the sole
declaration used in this case.
While the Department concentrates its argument on
the letters it mailed to Washington state agencies to
establish its diligence, the first step, that is what
inquiry it made of the mother, is utterly lacking.
Consequently, it failed to establish that it pursued the
most likely means of finding the defendant. (/// re
Arlvne A., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 598. 102
Cal.Rptr.2d 109.) Whether the mother was
forthcoming or would have been so is not properly
before us since there is no record to evaluate in this
regard.
We also note the record leaves unanswered a number
of other questions about the Department's diligence.
For instance, appellant testified of his employment
over the years, yet the Department, according to its
own showing, only checked once in July 2000, in
"SS/SSI Records." In addition, the one declaration of
parent search in the record refers to checking Fresno
County telephone and address directories. However,
given the mother's belief that he might be living in
Washington, one has to question why the Department
did not check directories from Washington state for
appellant. Along the same lines, the Department
learned early on in the course of its July 2000 parent
search that appellant had a recent mailing address in
Vancouver, Washington. Yet, there is no showing
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that this discovery triggered any further inquiry of the
mother or caused the Department to follow up and
check records in that particular part of Washington
state.
Even in June 2001, once agencies in Washington
state supplied the Department with what turned out to
be the residential address of appellant's father as well
as appellant's mailing address, the Department still
took no action to serve appellant with notice until
after he contacted the Department. Even then the
social worker initially gave appellant the wrong
section 366.26 hearing date. The Department's social
worker also made no effort to notify appellant of ongoing hearings in N.S.'s case. Indeed, as county
counsel once candidly admitted, despite appellant's
requests for telephone contact or visitation with N.S.,
the social worker appeared to "have been putting him
off."
*9 Perhaps the most damning evidence which
precludes a finding of due diligence in this case is the
fact that apparently the family support division of the
Fresno County District Attorney's Office did locate
appellant through his father's residence. It was that
agency's correspondence to appellant which led to his
appearance in this case. In other words, another
agency could locate appellant. Why could the
Department not do the same? Again, the record does
not offer any answers or explanations.
With particular respect to the Department's effort to
shift the blame to appellant, we reject its reliance on
this court's decision in In re Emily R., supra. In Emily
11, surra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d
285, we acknowledged that due process does not
require impracticable searches. However, the
circumstances in Emily R. were factually and legally
distinguishable from the present case. In Emily R., an
alleged father whose parental rights had been
terminated attacked the use of notice by publication.
He argued the agency involved failed to exercise due
diligence, ignoring the most likely means of finding
him. Unlike the situation in this case, the Emily R.
trial court repeatedly made findings which were
presumptively correct that the alleged father's
whereabouts were unknown and that reasonable
efforts had been made to locate and notify him. (In re
Emily R., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348-1349, 96
Cal.Rptr.2d 285.) Also, the alleged father in Emily R
., unlike appellant here, offered no evidence that the
agency could have ascertained his current address.

Given the Department's failure to establish that it
exercised due diligence to locate appellant, the
juvenile court could not properly proceed with the
section 366.26 hearing and terminate parental
rights. As further discussed below, in light of the
undisputed evidence that appellant qualified as a
presumed father, the court's error was prejudicial.
III. Paternity
[2] Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d)
provides that a man is presumed to be a child's father
if he "receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child." There is a
significant distinction between presumed and alleged
fathers in a dependency case. Presumed fathers have
a right to reunification services; alleged fathers do
not. (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 CaUth 1043,
1051, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 898 P.2d 891; /// re Emily
/?., supra. 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354-1355, 96
Cal.Rplr.2d285.)
Here, the facts presented were sufficient to establish
that appellant was N.S.'s presumed father under
Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). (Glen C.
v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 585586, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 103.) He received N.S. into his
home in the summer of 1999 and also helped provide
a home for her on at least two prior occasions. He
openly held out N.S. as his natural child, starting
shortly after her birth when the mother contacted him
and asked for help. He never disputed the mother's
decision to name him as N.S.'s father on the birth
certificate. Later, he even applied with the State of
Washington for medical benefits for N.S. Once he
learned of these proceedings and contacted the social
worker, he repeatedly referred to himself as the
child's father, to N.S. as "my daughter," spoke of his
love for her, and his regret over letting the mother
take her back in 1999.
*10 Respondent nevertheless contends appellant was
nothing more than an alleged father. The Department
criticizes appellant because he did not formally
initiate a parentage proceeding under section 316.2,
seek to establish paternity by blood test, or sign a
voluntary declaration of paternity. Respondent also
focuses on the evidence that appellant did not
financially support N.S., he took her into his home
for only three months and at the end of that period
allowed the mother take her away despite his prior
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concerns that the mother was abusing drugs and not
providing N.S. adequate care.
We reject respondent's assumption that the juvenile
court either did or could find appellant was only an
alleged father. The fact that the father did not
formally initiate a parentage proceeding under
section 316.2 or sign a voluntary declaration of
paternity is irrelevant under the circumstances of this
case. Indeed, respondent's argument is disingenuous
in this regard. Under section 316.2, subdivision (b), it
was either the court's or the Department's duty to give
appellant notice of his rights and his ability to admit
or deny parentage, by providing him with Judicial
Council form JV-505. [FN4] The form which is
entitled
"STATEMENT
REGARDING
PATERNITY" includes such options as "I do not
know if I am the father of the child and I [blank]
consent to [blank] request blood or DNA testing to
determine whether or not I am the father[,]" "I
believe I am the child's father and request that the
court enter a judgment of paternityf,]" and "I have
already established paternity of the child by ... A
voluntary declaration signed by me...." On the reverse
side of the Judicial Council form, there is also notice
to an alleged father that "If you wish the court to
determine paternity or if you wish to admit that you
are the father of the child, complete this form
according to your intentions." However, there is no
indication in the record that appellant was ever
served with such notice. Moreover, appellant's
participation in these proceedings, albeit belated, is
testament to his willingness to declare his paternity.
Indeed, respondent's further criticism of appellant for
not seeking to blood test ignores the evidence that he
volunteered to blood test.

FN4. Section 316.2, subd. (b) provides:
"If, after the court inquiry, one or more men
are identified as an alleged father, each
alleged father shall be provided notice at his
last and usual place of abode by certified
mail return receipt requested alleging that he
is or could be the father of the child. The
notice shall state that the child is the subject
of proceedings under Section 300 and that
the proceedings could result in the
termination of parental rights and
adoption of the child. Judicial Council form
Paternity-Waiver of Rights (JV-505) shall
be included with the notice. Nothing in this

section shall preclude a court from
terminating a father's parental rights
even if an action has been filed under
Section 7630 or 7631 of the Family Code."

Respondent's reliance on appellant's failure to
financially support N.S. as well as the fact that he
took her into his home for only three months and then
allowed the mother to take her away despite his prior
concerns is also irrelevant to the issue of presumed
father status under Family Code section 7611,
subdivision (d). Even appellant acknowledged he
should have done more for N.S. Such evidence still
does not undercut the undisputed evidence, however,
that appellant received her into his home and openly
held out N.S. as his natural child.
Respondent's reliance on In re Ariel H. (1999) 73
Cal.App.4th 70, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 is also
misplaced. Ariel H., supra, involved an adoption
action which a 15-year-old alleged father sought to
prevent. Notably, the alleged father in Ariel H.
presented no evidence that he was entitled to
presumed father status under Family Code section
7611, subdivision (d). In fact, he never saw the child
nor did he publicly acknowledge his paternity. He
instead tried to excuse his inaction by citing his own
minority, an argument which the appellate court
rejected. [In re Ariel //., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p.
74, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125.) Unlike the alleged father in
Ariel H., appellant "promptly attempted] to assume
his parental responsibilities as fully as the mother
[would] allow." (//•/ re Ariel, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at
73, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 125, quoting Adoption of'Kelsev S
. (1992) 1 CaUth 816, 849, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823
P.2d 1216.)
*11 In reviewing this record, we are struck by the
fact that in so many instances a finding of presumed
father status is supported by a fraction of the
evidence presented here. We have no doubt that had
the appellant appeared in these proceedings at an
earlier stage, no court would have hesitated to grant
him presumed father status on the undisputed
showing he made. What motivated the court in this
case is anyone's guess and frankly irrelevant given
that our review extends to the court's actions and not
its reasoning [Maneuso v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 88, 95, 283 Cal.Rptr. 300). In
any event, we conclude the violation of appellant's
due process rights was prejudicial given the
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undisputed evidence entitling him to presumed father
status under Family Code section 761 K subdivision
(d).
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is reversed.
The matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to enter an order declaring appellant to be
the presumed father of N.S. and conduct further
proceedings to resolve appellant's request for
placement and, in the alternative, to order
reunification services for his and N.S.'s benefit (see §
§ 361.2 & 361.5).
END OF DOCUMENT
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